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I. INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Zane Jack Fields replies in support of his appeal of the district court's dismissal 
of his petition for post-conviction relief. Respondent, (the "State"), rephrases the issues into three 
primary arguments against Fields' s appeal. State's Brief at 18. The State argues that: (1) Fields 
failed to provide an adequate record in the district court and on appeal in this Court; id. at 20-21; 
(2) Fields failed to establish that his successive petition was filed within 42 days of when its claims 
were known or reasonably should have been known; id. at 24-35; and (3) Fields's claims based on 
the Gilcrist recantation are barred under Idaho Code§ 19-2719(5)(b) because they are merely 
cumulative or impeaching. Id. at 35-36. For the reasons set forth below, the State's arguments 
fail and this Court should remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Fields Provided This Court With An Adequate Record 
The State argues that Fields failed to provide an adequate record of the underlying criminal 
and post-conviction cases in the district court and on appeal in this Court. State's Brief at 20-21. 
The State erroneously asserts that the district court did not rule on Fields's motion to take judicial 
notice of the underlying criminal and post-conviction cases. State's Brief at 20. The record 
contradicts this assertion. The district court granted Fields's motion for judicial notice of the 
underlying cases. R. 267. After the State filed its brief, Fields moved in this Court for judicial 
notice of the underlying criminal and post-conviction cases. Motion to Take Judicial Notice, filed 
May 8, 2013. This Court granted the motion. Order Granting Motion to Take Judicial Notice, 
filed May 9, 2013. The record on appeal is complete and includes the underlying criminal case 
and pertinent post-conviction cases. 
B. Fields Established That His Petition Was Filed Within 42 Days of When its 
Claims Were Known or Reasonably Should Have Been Known 
The State argues that the petition was untimely because he did not establish that it was filed 
within 42 days of when he knew or reasonably should have known of the claims based on 
Gilcrist's recantation. State's Brief at 24-35. To support its position, the State argues that 
Fields: did not make a sufficient showing of admissible facts with affidavits under oath, id. at 
26-27; cannot rely upon subsequently filed affidavits to establish when the claim was known or 
reasonably should have been known, id. at 26, 27, 29; and did not make a sufficient showing that 
the recantation reasonably could not have been known earlier, even if the subsequent affidavits are 
considered. Id. at 30-35. 
In the governing law section of its brief the State acknowledges that a successive capital 
petitioner "must make a prima facie showing" that the issues raised in the petition "were not 
known and reasonably could not have been known" within 42 days of entry of judgment. State's 
Brief at 22 (quoting Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995); State v. Rhoades, 
120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted). In its argument, 
however, the State fails to address the implications arising from the requirement that Fields make a 
primafacie showing that he reasonably could not have known of the Gilcrist recantation earlier 
than its discovery in June, 2011. 
The State overlooks the nature of a successive capital petitioner's initial burden - to make a 
primafacie showing that the new issues were unknown and reasonably could not have been known 
within42 days ofjudgment. See, e.g. Stuartv. State, 149 Idaho 35, 41, 232 P.3d 813, 819 (2010); 
Pizzuto v. State, 149 Idaho 155, 160, 233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010); Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289, 
17 P.3d 230, 233 (2000)("Fields IF'); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 701, 992 P.2d 144, 150 
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( 1999). A prima facie showing is only an initial showing. As the district court noted below, "[a] 
prima facie showing is a showing 'sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless 
disproved or rebutted."' R. 273 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1228 (81h ed. 2004)). Once the 
prima facie showing is made, the opponent may submit facts contesting the showing, and 
thereafter the proponent may submit additional evidence in support of the original contention or in 
rebuttal of the arguments asserted by the opponent. See, e.g., State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 88, 
856 P.2d 872, 878 (1993) (explaining initial burden of making a prima facie case and outlining 
three-step, alternating factual presentations in a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986)). The characterization of a successive capital petitioner's initial burden under§ 
19-2719(5) as a prima facie showing necessarily suggests that additional factual presentations in 
opposition and support of the statutory exception are contemplated. As shown in this and Fields's 
opening brief, additional factual submissions are contemplated. In fact, they are routine and to be 
expected in the procedural equivalent of summary judgment, where countervailing affidavits are 
the norm. 
1. Fields Filed His Post-Conviction Petition Within 42 Days of Discovering 
the Recantation and Made a Sufficient Prima Facie Showing that He 
Could Not Have Known of the Recantation Earlier 
The State argues that the petition was properly dismissed because Fields failed to make a 
sufficient showing under Idaho Code§ 19-2719(5)(a) and plead that he could not have reasonably 
known of the Gilcrist recantation earlier than its discovery in June, 2011. State's Brief at 25-26, 
30, 35. The State ignores the primafacie showing made by Fields in his petition and supporting 
affidavits. 
The petition met the statutory exception and made a prima facie showing that Fields 
reasonably could not have known of the Gilcrist recantation. The petition stated that "Fields's 
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lawyers and investigators have attempted to find and contact Harold Gilcrist, Scott Bianchi and 
Joseph Heistand repeatedly over the intervening years since Fields was convicted." R. 7ifl1. It 
acknowledged that despite repeated efforts, Fields "has been unable to procure a sworn statement 
from either Bianchi or Heistand." R. 8 if12. However, Fields expressly stated that "[a]fter 
repeated, unsuccessful attempts to find Harold Gilcrist, an investigator for Fields was finally 
successful in the summer of201 l." R. 8 ifl3. In support of all of these statements, Fields cited 
the Affidavit of investigator Greg Worthen, which was attached to the petition. See R. 7-8 
ififl l-13, R. 60-64. In his affidavit, Worthen described earlier investigators' unsuccessful past 
efforts to locate Gilcrist. Worthen also described his own efforts to locate Gilcrist. R. 61-63 
ifif3-8. 
Worthen stated that he got a lead on Gilcrist in May, 2011, only after trying mis-spellings 
of Gilcrist's name in the VINELink website. He located a "Harold Gilcrest," at the Kootenai 
County Jail. R. 63 if8. Worthen then confirmed that "Harold Gilcrest" was in fact Harold 
Gilcrist and arranged to interview him on June 17, 2011. Id. The day after the interview, Gilcrist 
was transferred to the Spokane County Jail in Washington. Id. On July 8, 2011, Worthen, an 
Idaho notary, see R. 264, obtained a declaration under penalty of perjury from Gilcrist, now an 
out-of-state Washington witness, while at the Spokane jail. R. 63 if8. See R. 70-71. The 
petition for post-conviction relief was filed on July 28, 2011, R. 4, twenty days after the 
declaration was obtained, and 41 days after the interview where Worthen first spoke to Gilcrist and 
learned of his recantation. 
Fields filed the post-conviction petition within 42 days of discovering Gilcrist's 
recantation. Fields acted promptly and filed his successive petition within a reasonable time of 
learning of Gilcrist's recantation. Under Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 
4 
(2008), "a reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two 
days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim." Fields's petition 
was timely filed within 42 days oflearning of the claims arising from the newly discovered 
recantation. 
While the State suggests that Fields' s petition does not state when Fields knew of the 
recantation claims, State's Brief at 30, it concedes that "the timeliness of a successive petition is a 
material fact that must be supported in the successive petition or with sworn statements 
accompanying the petition." State's Brief at 26 (emphasis added). As set forth above, Fields 
plainly stated when he learned of the recantation in Worthen's affidavit attached to the petition. 
Fields filed his petition within 42 days oflearning of the recantation. The State's argument that 
Fields did not establish when he knew of the claim is meritless. 
The State's primary objection to the timeliness of Fields's petition is that Fields 
"reasonably should have known" of the recantation earlier. State's Brief at 30-35. The State 
asserts that Fields was required to show in detail his continuing efforts to find Gilcrist for twenty 
years before the recantation was obtained. Citing insufficient detail and efforts, the State argues 
that Fields failed to show that he reasonably could not have learned of Gilcrist's recantation 
earlier. See id. at 25, 30-35. 
The State's position ignores the fact that Fields established he had been looking for Gilcrist 
unsuccessfully for years. 1 The State also ignores Gilcrist' s second affidavit, filed by Fields in 
response to the State's attacks on his prima facie case. That affidavit explicitly stated that Gilcrist 
1 Fields supplemented his pleadings and Worthen's affidavit with an additional affidavit from his 
counsel, Bruce Livingston. R. 186-87. That affidavit provided additional details of the long 
search for Gilcrist, first by prior counsel in the mid-1990' s, and then by the Federal Defenders in 
the 2000's. Those efforts continued as set forth in Worthen's affidavit, culminating in his finally 
finding and interviewing Gilcrist in 2011 and obtaining the recantation. 
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"took stock of [his] life" after a near death experience and coma in 2009, and that he "would not 
have told the truth about what happened" before his medical crisis. R. 264. 
The State acknowledges that'" [i]n many cases, no amount of due diligence on the part of a 
petitioner can compel a witness to come forward and admit to prevaricated testimony."' State's 
Brief at 35 (quoting Pacheco v. Artuz, 193 F.Supp.2d 756, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). This is such a 
case, as shown by Gilcrist's second affidavit indicating he would not have told the truth about his 
perjury and Detective Smith's misconduct until after his near death experience in 2009. Without 
Gilcrist as a willing, recanting witness, Fields had no knowledge of any recantation claim that he 
could assert. The State ignores that fact and the import of Pacheco in arguing that Fields has not 
established that he reasonably could not have known of the recantation in the 20 years before it 
was obtained. 
The State's argument is wrong for several reasons. Nobody can compel a witness to 
recant his testimony. Gilcrist himself provided an affidavit saying he wouldn't have recanted his 
testimony before his near death experience in 2009. Without Fields knowing of Gilcrist's 
recantation, it is unreasonable to contend that Fields reasonably could have known of the 
non-existent recantation from a witness unwilling to recant. As this Court noted only a year 
before Fields obtained the recantation, a petitioner either "reasonably should have known" or 
"reasonably could not have known." Stuart, 149 Idaho at 48, 235 P.3d at 826. Here, Fields 
reasonably should have known of any claims arising from Gilcrist's recantation only after Gilcrist 
was willing to recant and Fields was able to find him and obtain the recantation. Accordingly, 
until that time, June 17, 2011, Fields reasonably could not have known of the recantation. The 
State's arguments to the contrary are without merit. 
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2. Fields Alleged Admissible Facts Under Oath or Affirmation 
The State asserts that Gilcrist's declaration must be disregarded because it "was not 'stated 
under oath or affirmation' as required by LC.§ 19-2715(5)(l)(ii) [sic]."2 State's Brief at 26. For 
a variety of reasons, the State is wrong. 
First, the State's argument that the original declaration did not constitute an affirmation is 
wrong. See State's Brief at 27. The State ignores the pertinent portion of the definition of 
"affirmation" referenced by Fields. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 14 ("An affirmation is a 
'solemn declaration ... that the witness will tell the truth, etc. this being substituted for an oath in 
certain cases)( emphasis added in Opening Brief). The State's argument, that the "definition for 
'affirmation' utilized by Fields is in conjunction with whether 'an affidavit is true[,]'" State's Brief 
at 27, ignores the definition relied upon by Fields, that an affirmation is a declaration that the 
witness will tell the truth. The State also argues that Gilcrist "failed to 'affirm' that the contents 
of the declaration are true." State's Brief at 27. Again, the State ignores the clear record 
evidence. In his declaration, Gilcrist affirmatively stated that "I declare under penalty of perjury 
that the foregoing is true and correct." R. 71. 
Second, the State's reliance on Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010), is 
misplaced. State's Brief at 26. Kelly did not involve an argument that the document at issue was 
a declaration of facts signed and affirmed to be true, as Fields argues here. Rather, Kelly involved 
a document denominated as an "Affidavit" but which was unsigned, in addition to not being 
notarized. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 523, 236 P.3d at 1283. In those circumstances, this Court had no 
difficulty in concluding that the unsigned document did not constitute an affidavit. Id. 
2 The correct cite is LC.§ 19-2719(5)(a)(ii). 
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However, Kelly neither presented the question of what constitutes a precise statement of material 
facts made under affirmation, nor addressed it. Id. Cf LC. § 19-2719(5)(a)(ii). 
Third, the State's reliance on Tri State Land Co., Inc. v. Roberts, 131 Idaho 835, 838-39, 
965 P.2d 195, 198-99 (Ct. App. 1998), is likewise misplaced. See State's Brief at 26-27. Tri 
State was a summary judgment proceeding brought under Civil Rule 56 and only addressed 
whether the document in question was an affidavit. As with Kelly, the court in Tri State was 
neither presented with, nor addressed, the issue under§ 19-2719(5)(a) regarding the requirements 
of a precise. factual statement made under affirmation. 
One significant aspect of Tri State which the State did not address was the failure of the 
proponent of the defective affidavit to "cure the alleged defect ... despite having notice of the 
defect several days prior to the hearing." Tri State, 131 Idaho at 837, 965 P.2d at 197. While Tri 
State was a summary judgment proceeding, that is the equivalent of summary dismissal in 
post-conviction proceedings. In this case, Fields subsequently submitted a sworn and notarized 
affidavit, in response to the State's objection to the Gilcrist declaration that was attached to the 
petition. That affidavit re-stated verbatim the factual allegations set forth in the declaration that 
was attached to the petition. R. 176-77. To the extent the declaration was defective, which 
Fields contends it was not, Fields "cured" any defect. That was perfectly acceptable under Idaho 
law, as noted in Tri State and set forth in the next section. 
3. Affidavits Filed Subsequent to the Petition in a Successive Capital 
Post-Conviction Case Must Be Considered When Ruling Upon a 
Summary Dismissal Motion 
The State argues that the district court was correct in refusing to consider subsequently 
filed affidavits. State's Brief at 27. Contrary to the State's assertions, affidavits filed subsequent 
to the petition must be considered when ruling upon a summary dismissal motion. This is true 
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when the State seeks dismissal for petitioner's alleged failure to make a prima facie showing that 
he meets the exception of§ 19-2719(5)(a) for issues "that could not reasonably have been known." 
Subsequent affidavits must also be considered when the State alleges that the petitioner failed to 
precisely state the issue with material facts by credible persons with first-hand knowledge under 
oath or affirmation. See LC.§ 19-2719(5)(a)(i & ii). 
The State fails in its efforts to distinguish the cases on which Fields relies. State's Brief at 
27-29. The cases cited by Fields all considered subsequent affidavits filed after the petition in 
ruling on the State's motion for summary dismissal. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-11. 
The State concedes that a subsequent affidavit was considered in Pizzuto, 149 Idaho 155, 
233 P.3d 86 (2010). State's Brief at 29. However, the State asserts that this Court "did not 
address the issue based upon heightened pleading requirements, but considered the content of 
Rice's subsequent affidavit and the fact it also failed to detail the timing of various events." 
State's Brief at 29 (citing Pizzuto, 149 Idaho at 161-62). According to the State, this shows that 
the heightened pleading requirement was not addressed. The State is wrong, and more 
importantly, misses the point. 
After extensively discussing both Rice's initial affidavit and his subsequent affidavit, this 
Court plainly articulated its basis for rejecting Pizzuto's claims: he "failed to make a prima facie 
showing that his claims were not known or could not reasonably have been known" when he filed 
his first post-conviction petition. Pizzuto, 149 Idaho at 162, 233 P.3d at 93 (citing LC.§ 
19-2719(5)). This Court explicitly discussed the subsequent affidavit and endorsed the State's 
argument that the information from Rice could have been known earlier because "Rice never 
stated he had previously been asked about the plea agreement and either lied or declined to 
answer." Id. This information directly relates to when Pizzuto reasonably should have known of 
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Rice's information about an undisclosed deal. It obviously concerns the heightened pleading 
requirement and the § 19-2719(5) exception for claims that reasonably could not have been 
known. Most significant is the information which the State and this Court considered and 
acknowledged might have helped Pizzuto make the required prima facie showing from Rice's 
subsequent affidavit, i.e., whether Rice previously refused to cooperate with the defense and 
disclose the truth. This is the exact kind of information that Gilcrist provided in his subsequent 
affidavit, i.e., that Gilcrist would not have told the truth prior to his near death experience in 2009. 
The State also concedes that subsequently filed affidavits were considered in McKinney, 
13 3 Idaho at 698, 992 P .2d at 14 7, but contends that the issue before the court was not whether the 
heightened pleading requirements had been met. State's Brief at 28. Instead the State 
characterizes the issue as whether IAC claims should have been raised in the first petition. Id. 
The State fails to recognize several aspects of the McKinney opinion which make clear that the 
heightened pleading burden was at issue, was addressed and was dispositive, notwithstanding the 
subsequently filed affidavits and evidence developed in discovery. 
McKinney plainly stated the applicable law, including the petitioner's "heightened burden" 
to make "a prima facie showing" that the "issues raised were not known and could not reasonably 
have been known within 42 days of judgment." 133 Idaho at 701, 992 P.2d at 150. After 
permitting subsequent affidavits, the district court denied most of McKinney's claims on the 
ground that they should have been known during the first post-conviction and were barred by§ 
19-2719. McKinney, 133 Idaho at 698-99, 992 P.2d at 147-48. This Court refused to excuse the· 
bar and upheld the dismissal of McKinney's ineffective assistance of counsel claims based 
explicitly on§ 19-2719(5) and the fact that McKinney was restricted to claims he could not 
reasonably have known at the time of his first post-conviction petition. His claims were 
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dismissed because he failed to meet the exception, since the issues should reasonably have been 
known at the time of the first petition. McKinney, 133 Idaho at 704, 992 P.2d at 153. Just as 
significantly, this Court applied§ 19-2719 to bar claims ofprosecutorial misconduct, based on 
subsequently developed evidence of undisclosed, potentially exculpatory information, McKinney, 
133 Idaho at 705-07, 992 P.2d at 154-56, because some of the information "reasonably should 
have been known at the time of McKinney's first petition for post-conviction relief," and for other 
evidence because McKinney "did not make the required prima facie showing that the issues could 
not reasonably have been known during the first proceeding." McKinney, 133 Idaho at 707, 992 
P .2d at 156. The State's characterization of the McKinney case as not involving the prima facie 
showing of the "reasonably could not have been known" exception under§ 19-2719(5) is plainly 
incorrect. 
The State also misapprehends the significance of an earlier Fields case, asserting that the 
case "actually bolsters the state's argument." State's Brief at 29 (citing Fields II, 135 Idaho at 
290-91, 17 P.3d at 234-35). The State acknowledges that a subsequent affidavit from Bryant was 
filed, but argues broadly that the contents of the affidavit were not considered because it could not 
be a basis for post-conviction relief on Fields's original petition. State's Brief at 29. The 
original petition set forth a Brady claim for non-disclosure of a deal with the inmate witnesses, but 
it did not include another different Brady claim that witnesses recanted their testimony and 
acknowledged being fed information by Detective Smith. See ISC#24119, R. 37. This Court 
considered the subsequent Bryant affidavit with respect to the Brady claim that was raised in the 
petition, regarding the alleged deal with the inmate informants, but rejected the claim on its merits 
because the subsequent Bryant affidavit and attached letter allegedly did not support a Brady 
claim. Fields II, 135 Idaho at 290-91, 17 P.3d at 234-35. See ISC#24119, R. 78-79 ~2, 83-84 
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(subsequently filed affidavits allegations regarding inmate deal and attached letter from Detective 
Smith). What this Court declined to consider were additional allegations of a different Brady 
claim that had not been alleged in the petition. Fields II, 135 Idaho at 291, 17 P.3d at 235. See 
ISC#24 l 19, R. 79.:.81 (raising allegations from Bryant's interviews with inmates Acheson, Bianchi 
and Troutner that were not included in the earlier filed petition). Cf ISC#241l9, R. 37. That 
aspect of Fields II is inapplicable here, however, as Gilcrist's subsequent affidavit re-stated 
verbatim the original allegations of his originally filed declaration which announced the 
recantation of his testimony and Detective Smith's misconduct. The substance of petitioner's 
claims and allegations did not change, and therefore the State's reliance on Fields II is 
unwarranted. 
In conclusion, Fields presented enough evidence in his initial filing in this case to allow the 
fact-finder to infer Fields reasonably did not know and reasonably could not have known of 
Gilcrist's recantation until Fields obtained it, following many years of attempting to find and 
interview Gilcrist without success. Once the State asserted that Fields had not sufficiently shown 
that he could not have obtained the information earlier, Fields responded with additional affidavits 
setting forth additional efforts to obtain the recantation and Gilcrist's unwillingness to tell the truth 
until after his near death experience in 2009. These are the types of additional factual showings 
that have been contemplated and accepted by this Court in summary dismissal proceedings in 
capital and non-capital proceedings for many years. 
This Court has never held that Idaho courts may not consider subsequently filed affidavits 
in support of a successive petition for post-conviction relief, either ( 1) to meet the exception under 
§ 19-2719( 5) for unknown claims that could not reasonably have been known, or (2) to meet the 
statute's requirement that the claims be supported with a precise statement of material facts under 
12 
oath or affirmation by credible person with first-hand knowledge, or indeed, (3) to establish the 
elements of each claim. The State offers no Idaho case with such a holding. On the contrary, the 
cases cited here and in Appellant's Opening Brief show that supplementary factual submissions 
are allowed and considered in making summary dismissal determinations. The district court 
wrongly refused to consider them in this case. 
C. The Petition Is Not Facially Insufficient Because it Raised Substantive Claims 
Not Limited to Impeachment 
The State acknowledges that Fields raised claims based on evidence of Detective Smith's 
misconduct. The State contends that Fields's citation to cases alleging suppression of 
exculpatory evidence and knowing use of perjured testimony "do not involve allegations of 
misconduct based upon Detective Smith's alleged misconduct that forms the basis of Gilcrist' s 
recantation." State's Brief at 36. Though it is unclear precisely what this means, 3 the State 
concedes that Fields raised a prosecutorial misconduct (Due Process Clause) claim for the 
suppression of exculpatory evidence involving Detective Smith's feeding of information to 
inmates to inculpate Fields. 
Yet the State contends that the recantation can only be used as impeachment since Gilcrist 
did not testify at trial. The State is wrong. Fields could have called Gilcrist to testify to the 
substance of Detective Smith's misconduct, particularly his willingness to feed critical unknown 
information about the crime to inmates willing to testify against Fields. This would have 
provided material, exculpatory evidence of undisclosed police wrongdoing that would have 
compromised the police investigation and case against Fields. Though there is an undeniable 
3 Obviously, none of the Supreme Court cases cited by Petitioner, Appellant's Opening Brief at 15, 
will involve either Detective Smith's misconduct or Gilcrist's recantation, as neither was involved 
in any of those cases. 
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impeachment angle as well, the petition is not deficient, given the other substantive aspects of the 
recantation in establishing undisclosed exculpatory evidence. Evidence arising from the 
recantation certainly could have been used for impeachment purposes at trial. Those same facts 
provide substantive evidence of Detective Smith's conduct that goes to the heart ofFields's claims 
of innocence, suppressed exculpatory information and misuse of informants, all as outlined in 
Fields's petition. Moreover, even if§ 19-2719(5)(b) purports to foreclose United States v. 
Bagley, 473 US 667 (1985) impeachment claims in the post-conviction process, the statute does 
not foreclose other substantive claims, Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), and otherwise, R. 
4-16, nor those substantive claims that are inextricably intertwined with the impeaching material.4 
The district court's failure to address Fields's substantive claims cannot be excused based on§ 
19-2719(5)(b). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above and in Appellant's Opening Brief, this Court should 
reverse the district court and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing. 
4 In a footnote at the end of its brief, the State contends that even ifthe allegations of Fields's 
petition are true, they do not "cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence." State's 
Brief at 36n.5. The allegations ofFields's petition must be taken as true at the summary dismissal 
stage. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 7 (court views the facts in a light most favorable to 
petitioner). Fields has not received an evidentiary hearing on his claims, which the State 
acknowledges involve unresolved credibility disputes. State's Brief at 36n.5. Fields agrees with 
the State that a clear, unresolved credibility dispute exists. Fields is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing. Given the allegations in the petition and its supporting attachments, R. 4-117, along with 
Fields's additional argument and factual submissions, R. 164-87, 261-65, this Court must have 
doubt on the reliability of the conviction and sentence, contrary to the State's assertion. 
14 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of May, 2013. 
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